We construct multipartite entangled states with underlying W -type structure satisfying positive partial transpose (PPT) condition under any (N − 1)|1 partition. Then we show how to distill Npartite secure key form the states using two different methods: direct application of local filtering and novel random key distillation scheme in which we adopt the idea form recent results on entanglement distillation. Open problems and possible implications are also discussed.
Introduction. -Quantum cryptography [1, 2] is an impressive information-theoretic application of quantum physical laws in data security theory. The proofs [3, 4] of unconditional security of pioneering quantum cryptographic protocol [1] refer to the idea of quantum privacy amplification [5] based on entanglement distillation protocol [6] . This refers back to the cryptographic protocol [2] which is based on shared pure entanglement and is in fact the first explicit application of entanglement in information theory. Since then we already know that all correlation-based cryptographic protocols require entanglement as a necessary resource [7] . While it was natural to expect that distillation of pure entanglement is necessary to cryptography, it happened that even nondistillable entanglement known as a bound entanglement [8] may, at least in some cases, be useful for cryptography [9] with the corresponding general entanglement-based cryptographic paradigm going beyond entanglement distillation developed in [10] (for recent interesting applications in security proofs and physical analysis of security see Refs. [11, 12] ). Recently multipartite version of the latter has been worked out in Refs. [13, 14] . Especially in the latter multipartite bound entanglement has been constructed based on twisted GHZ-type of entanglement. Here we present a nonstandard application of the paradigm with a novel type of multipartite bound entanglement, namely the one with underlying W -like structure. We adopt here the idea of random distillation of entanglement [15, 16] introducing the notion of random distillation of secure key. The latter seems to be much more efficient for the present states than the concatenation of usual bipartite protocols with classical postprocessing.
N -partite noisy W -like states passing singlesystem PPT test. -Below we provide a detailed construction of bound entangled states, which exhibit the * Electronic address: remigiusz.augusiak@icfo.es † Electronic address: pawel@mif.pg.gda.pl We give a detailed proof that partial transposition with respect to each single-party subsystem is positive. Let us start by introducing the following matrices
where u ij denotes elements of some unitary matrix U D . The sum of absolute values of all elements of U D will be denoted by U D . For simplicity we can also assume U D to be Hermitian. Now let us define
where subscripts indicate that the matrix represents parts of i-th and j-th party and Γ j stands for partial transposition with respect to the subsystem belonging to j-th party. Moreover, addition is modulo N . For instance Z Γ2 1,2 is a part of quantum systems belonging to the first and second party that must be transposed with respect to the second party.
Let us now shortly discuss the properties of X (N )
All the matrices X 
for any i = 1, . . . , N . Now we are prepared to present the construction. For this purpose let us introduce
and denote by |ψ
) pure N -qubit states in which i-th party (i-th and j-th parties) posses |1 and the remaining parties have |0 . Let also P (N ) i and P (N ) ij be projectors onto |ψ (N ) i and |ψ (N ) ij , respectively. Then we can consider the following class of states
where the normalization factor is given by
N denote the key part and shield part of the state. They are separated by the tensor product visible in Eq. (7) . "Everything" that is on the left-hand side of this sign belongs to A and everything on the right-hand side belongs to A ′ . Usually one considers the situation in which the ith party has two subsystems denoted here by A i and A ′ i (one from A and one from A ′ ). However, in a more general scenario we can also assume that the whole A ′ is held by some other but trusted party or even more trusted parties.
Let us now check the positivity of partial transposition with respect to the i-th subsystem. Straightforward algebra shows that ̺
is of the form (Eq. (8)).
To make the analysis simpler, some of the terms in the above were grouped in square brackets. The positivity of the first and second brackets follows straightforwardly from results of Ref. are bound entangled provided that they are entangled. However, the latter still needs to be shown. For this purpose below we discuss cryptographical applicability of these states.
Secure key distillation. -We prove that it is possible to distill a nonzero amount of cryptographic key from the states ̺ . Let us focus on the scenario in which the remaining N −2 parties cooperate "passively", i.e., they perform no action but are trusted (do not cooperate with Eve). In this case the distillable key [24] can only be higher than in a scenario in which the remaining N − 2 parties would give some of their systems to Eve. Thus, for our purposes it suffices to investigate the bipartite distillable key of the states [25 
for any k = l (note that tracing out the subsystems may be treated as giving them to Eve). As in what follows the additional systems are not directly used in secure key distillation and the remaining parties are trusted, we can considerably simplify the analysis by applying the general bipartite cryp-tographical paradigm studied in [9, 10] . Indeed, we can even consider the system A ′ as one distributed between A k and A l . However, it does not mean that the considered scenario is only bipartite since the total protocol will consist of bipartite protocols with different pairs {k, l}.
We investigate the bipartite distillable key using two methods. The first one is quite simple application of local filtering, while the second one, probably more efficient, bases on the ideas of random distillation of entanglement given in Refs. [15, 16] . Both protocols, are finally concatenated with the Devetak-Winter (DW) protocol [17, 18] .
We also simplify our considerations by imposing some constraints on U D , namely, we assume that all of its entries obey Twistings and privacy squeezing.
In view of what was said previously it suffices to restrict our considerations to the distillation of bipartite secure key. The general cryptographical paradigm of Refs. [9, 10, 19] is exactly what we need here. Thus, below we recall some of its main ideas, namely, twistings and the privacy squeezing [10] with its application in the recent method [19] of bounding the key form below. Possible multipartite generalizations of the paradigm were studied in Refs. [13, 14] .
Let then ̺ ABA ′ B ′ denote some bipartite state with the AB (A ′ B ′ ) part called the key (shield) part (notice once more that in general in the considered scenario one does not have to demand that the A ′ B ′ part belong to the involved parties as it may be in possession of some other trusted party). Now, let B = {|ij } denote some product basis in the Hilbert space corresponding to the AB part. Then one defines the ccq state ̺ (ccq) ABE to be a state that arises upon a measurement of the AB part of a purification |ψ ABA ′ B ′ E of ̺ ABA ′ B ′ in the product basis B and tracing out the shield part A ′ B ′ (in the usual scenarios the shield part is treated then as a trivial subsystem). Now, we define twisting (with respect to the basis B) to be the following operation:
where in general U ij denote some isometries acting on the A ′ B ′ part. The important fact connected to twistings is that ̺ ABA ′ B ′ and its twisted version U t ̺ ABA ′ B ′ U † t have the same ccq state (with respect to the same basis).
The last concept we would like to mention here is the so-called privacy squeezing. Namely, by "rotating" the state ̺ ABA ′ B ′ with some appropriately chosen twisting U t and then tracing out its shield part we get the privacy squeezed state
Now, the method applied first in Ref. [19] implies that taking the purification | Ψ ABE of the latter and measuring it in the basis AB produces the ccq state with C D being a lower bound on distillable key of original state ̺ ABA ′ B ′ . Let us apply this technique carefully to our example with general shield system A ′ . Firstly, it follows from Ref. [10] 
A k A l E denotes the ccq derived according to the aforementioned prescription. On the other hand, we can consider a twisted purification
As previously mentioned the ccq state (denoted as σ (ccq)
A k A l E ) following this purification is exactly the same as ̺ (ccq)
. Finally, we can consider a worse situation from the point of secure key distillation between the parties A k and A l . Namely giving now the A ′ subsystem we can only lower the key. In other words, we can look at the twisted purification |ψ t as coming from purifying only the A k A l (with the whole system E ′ = A ′ E considered to be in Eve's hands). In this
denotes the ccq state derived in this way. The last step is an application of the Devetak-Winter protocol to ̺
, where the quantities [26] I(A k : A l ) and I(A k : E) are calculated for respective bipartite reductions of ̺ (ccq)
and therefore in what follows we can restrict to the analysis of distillable key of ̺ (ccq)
In other words we need to take privacy-squeezed ̺ and U 00 = U 11 = ½ D 2N , we get after some calculations from Eq. (7) that
where 
and let the k-th and l-th party apply it. This with probability q . Secondly, as local filtering is a stochastic operation, multiplying the latter with the success probability q (ǫ) D,N we get the desired result. This, however, according to the discussion above allows us to write (12) where both I are calculated from reductions of ̺ (ccq,ǫ)
The behaviour of the right-hand side (denoted by K leads to the distillation of a genuine multipartite secure key among all the parties. For this purpose notice firstly that in the general case of an N -partite state it suffices to have a bipartite secure key among pairs A i A i+1 (i = 1, . . . , N −1). Secondly, let us assume that each such pair distills a secure key at a rate r. Then one concludes that in such a configuration all the parties can distill multipartite key at a rate at least r/(N − 1). Since we showed that in the case of our states r is nonzero, the multipartite distillable key of ̺ . For simplicity we focus here only on the case of N = 3, however, generalization to more parties is straightforward.
Let us then consider the following POVM ⊗ W ǫ . Finally, the third group consists of the remaining outcomes. The results from the second group are treated as a success since they lead to secure key distillation. On the contrary any result from the third group is considered as a failure as the resulting state has a separable structure with respect to the key part. In the case when the obtained result belongs to the second or third group, the protocol stops. On the other hand, when the result belongs to the first group we have to repeat our protocol as the obtained result keeps the structure of the initial state.
Let us now pass to the protocol. Assume that the parties repeat the measurement M times, but in such way that in each round the value of ǫ in the definition of POVM differs. Precisely, following Ref. [15] we utilize ǫ i = 1/ √ 1 + i, however, in a reversed order, i.e., in the first round we take ǫ M = 1/ √ 1 + M and in the last one
Taking into account a single success outcome V ⊗2 ǫ ⊗W ǫ (corresponding to the secure key distillation between the first and second party), the state after M measurements is of the form ρ
The probability of appearance of ρ
2 . Let us briefly explain Eq. (13) . The first term corresponds to the success obtained in the first round of the protocol, while the second term is responsible for the outcome from the first group obtained in the first round and the success obtained in the second round. The remaining terms may be derived in an analogous way.
Since we chose the success outcome corresponding to the key distillation between parties A 1 and A 2 we can trace the key part of the last party of ρ
A1A2A ′ . As we are interested in application of the DW protocol we can apply the privacy squeezing with the same twisting operation U t as in previous subsection, which effectively removes the shield part and produces finally
where G D . Let us notice also that in the asymptotic limit M → ∞ the probability q (M) D tends to one-third. It means that taking into account all the three success outputs we are sure that in the limit of M → ∞ the secure bit will be shared by one of the pairs of parties.
Finally, in the same way as previously we get
where I are calculated for reductions of the ccq state ρ
A1A2 . The behavior of the function appearing on the right-hand side of the above, i.e., the difference between mutual information multiplied by q Fig. 2 . On the other hand, one may prove analytically that it is possible to get a secure key from ρ To finish our considerations we discuss what rates of multipartite key are achievable within the described method. We already know that to get the multipartite key it suffices to have secure key between some properly chosen parties. However in previous cases we needed to divide protocol into separate N − 1 bipartite deterministic protocols, while here we get different bipartite keys in one deterministic protocol. This suggests that we can think a little bit clever while estimating the multipartite key rate here.
For this purpose let us focus on the three-partite case and and consider the rates r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , where r 1 is a key rate between A 1 and A 2 and so on. Assume that all the rates r i are positive and form the triangle inequality. In this case there exist a triple of positive numbers a, b, c such that (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) = (a + b, b + c, c + a), it is not difficult to conclude that the rate of multipartite key may be lower bounded by a + b + c = (
all rates r i are equal to K DW and the obtainable rate of multipartite key is (3/2)K DW .
Distillation of a "truly" random secure key -is this possible for bound entangled states? In the previous section we have considered random distillation of a secure key. In this process all the parties have to cooperate. Indeed the performances of the protocol have been estimated with privacy squeezing involving all "primed" parties as a shield part. This means that during the protocol the passive parties (like A 3 in the analysis from the previous subsection) were trusted in the sense that keep their "primed" subsystems (A This means that effectively the bipartite key between A 1 and A 2 can only at this early stage get correlated to the third party. But what if we were interested in a true random bipartite key, i.e., such that after the random bipartite protocol the (random) bipartite key is secure not only against Eve but also against other parties? This may be also related to a two-stages protocol: N trusted parties representing some public company are given N -partite state and distill such random key in a way that it is truly bipartite. After that, N different parties come and use that key having all the bipartite secure communications guaranteed.
Note that this kind of random secure key would share with entanglement the monogamy property. The natural question is which multipartite bound entangled states can lead to the key with such a property. Preliminary analysis of our W -like states seems to suggests that it is impossible to get such key form our states.
Discussion. -We have provided a construction of novel multipartite bound entangled states with underlying W -type structure. The states satisfy PPT test for any (N − 1)|1 partition. We have analyzed distillation of a secure key form the states in two different ways. The first one is based on the usual bipartite filteringbased protocol followed by the DW scheme. The second one involves random distillation of secure key. Though we have not proven the optimality of the protocols, the present results suggest that, as in the entanglement distillation, the random distillation of a secure key may be much more efficient in the distillation of a multipartite cryptographic key in cases when one deals with underlying W -type structure. However, since the present states are the first bound entangled states of this type, still further analysis is necessary. One also expects that bound entanglement of other multipartite types like graph states [20] may be also constructed and found to be useful in quantum cryptography. It is interesting to address this type of questions in the context of recently discovered thermal bound entanglement in quantum arrays and lattices [21] . On the other hand, one may ask about the distillation of a quantum key in a modified sense: this would be the "truly" random bipartite key in the sense that bipartite cryptographic correlations were secure not only against Eve but also against all the remaining parties. Note that, of course this is possible in case of some free entangled states: Lo-Fortesque protocol followed by classical measurement of entangled pairs provides naturally such key. Here the natural question arises which bound entangled states lead to such key.
Another natural question concerns the relation of the present results to quantum channels capacities. Indeed the present states as well as the states from [14] may be immediately used to generate a quantum channel (with k senders and n − k receivers). It is interesting that while the one-sender channels created from the GHZtype states [14] have strictly positive one-way multipartite privacy capacity P nonzero (due to generalized DW protocol) it seems to be rather unlikely that the channels based on the present W -like states have that property. Still, in context of fascinating and still uncovered role of privacy in the recently discovered superactivation effect of quantum bipartite capacity [22] , and especially in the context of multipartite superactivation and activation of quantum capacities and entanglement (see [23] ), further analysis of quantum channels based on the present states seems to be interesting.
